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Competent security administrators are needed for effective detection of incessant criminal intrusion attempts we witness 
nowadays. The required competence includes the ability to analyze a suspicious attempt with a high degree of awareness of 
the situation surrounding the attempt. However, the extant literature on information security awareness focuses on end-user 
education and overlooks the type that is critical for security administrators to perform their tasks. This paper presents a model 
about factors influencing detection of criminal intrusions, based on the military concept of situation awareness (SA). We 
argue that in using intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to deflect criminal intrusions, SA is critical because of the highly 
dynamic nature of the task at hand and the information processing capability it requires. We support our argument by 
explicating the roles of two foundational antecedents to SA – experience (as evidenced in the administrator’s usage pattern of 
memory) and interface design (graphical versus command-line). 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion detection is part of the first line of defense against cybercrimes. In the age of ubiquitous computing attempts at 
intruding systems with criminal intent are incessant. Cybercriminals are constantly devising ever more innovative ways for 
criminal intrusions, as epitomized by zero-day attacks. They also become increasingly creative in methods of evading 
detection. To fight cybercrimes, it is imperative that intrusion detection systems (IDSs) remain at their best at detecting 
criminal intrusions and thwarting attempts at evading detection. However, the physical installation of IDSs is only a small 
part of intrusion detection. What counts more is how they are put to effective use, by human. For a security administrator to 
make sense of the voluminous data generated by IDSs and, accordingly, take correct actions upon them, he/she needs to have 
a correct understanding of the situation in which suspicious activities reported by IDSs occur as well as how potential 
countermeasures may interact with the environment. Such awareness of the situation is critical to successful detection of 
criminal intrusions. 
In this paper, we pioneer the application of well-established military theories on situation awareness (SA) to detection of 
criminal intrusions. SA is ”the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1995, p. 36). SA stresses the 
importance of user-centered design over technology-centered design. The latter refers to situations where technology is 
supposed to perform certain functionality being evaluated on the degree of promised functionality delivered. In contrast, user-
centered design approach calls for designing interfaces focused on users’ goals, tasks, and needs, rather than on technology. 
Thus, user-centered design takes into account the way users process information. SA is the key foundation underlying user-
centered design (Endsley, Bolté, & Jones, 2003).  
SA is best applicable in situations where reaction time is critical (Endsley, 1995). Intrusion detection is exactly such an area – 
timely recognition and prevention of intrusion attempts play a significant role in protecting organizational information assets. 
Human intervention is usually required to prevent or minimize damage, discern activities indicative of more serious attacks, 
identify cybercriminals, discover new attack patterns, and more importantly collect evidence (Sommer, 1999). Thus, security 
administrators are responsible for a wide range of crime-preventing activities, where timely reaction is absolutely critical and 
high levels of SA are indispensable. 
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To explicate the means by which SA influences criminal intrusion detection, we study two critical factors, user experience 
and system’s interface design, that are foundational in producing effective SA. Based on information processing theory, user 
experience is a function of presence or absence of long-term memory patterns, which distinguishes between novices and 
experts. However, the relationship between experience and the level of SA is impacted by two types of interface design: 
graphical user interface (GUI) and command-line. Following the current literature on SA, we further argue that high levels of 
SA enhance criminal intrusion detection, both directly and indirectly via improving decision quality. This paper’s goal is to 
answer the following research question: how do experience and interface design influence situation awareness, and, in turn, 
the ability to perform proper actions to detect criminal intrusion attempts?  
Unlike the commonly discussed “security awareness,” which often stays at the superficial level of end-user understanding of 
security policies (Whitman & Mattord, 2008), we apply SA to pinpoint a security administrator’s comprehension of technical 
situation surrounding a suspicious event or alert. To the best of our knowledge, this concept has not been studied before. The 
importance of SA cannot be over-emphasized because it is critical to a highly dynamic, time sensitive undertaking, be it 
detecting criminal intrusions into computers or maneuvering a billion-dollar fighter jet. 
Our study is organized in the following manner. We first discuss the state of current research on information security 
awareness, which allows us to identify the research gap, and arrive at our research question. Next, we provide a brief 
introduction to intrusion detection systems to frame the context for our study. We then introduce our research model, and 
present our set of propositions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As mentioned above, the current literature on security awareness overlooks the technical type of awareness that can be more 
important when it comes to technical security tasks such as administering an IDS. To evaluate the effectuality (or lack 
thereof) of security awareness in handling technical tasks, i.e., interacting with computers, we evaluate security awareness 
studies through the lens of human-computer interaction (HCI). The theoretical framework we adopt is Zhang & Li (2005). 
This framework illustrates issues and components characteristic to human interactions with technology, including: Human, 
Context, Technology, and Task/Job. The framework’s purpose is purely illustrative and by no means exhaustive or inclusive. 
The review of literature (Table 1) reveals that most studies have concentrated on “Human” and “Context” components of the 
HCI framework. Human component includes topics like cognition, emotion and motivation, and demographics. Context 
component is composed of global, social, organizational, and group contexts. Thus, the studies described in Table 1 primarily 
concentrate on the interactions of these two components, with most of them focused on organizational contexts: 
organizational goals, culture & norms, policies and procedures, and management support. Relatively little attention has been 
devoted to the interaction of Technology (in terms of design) and Human (in terms of cognition) components. This paper 
aims at filling in this gap. There are other factors than can obstruct achieving SA that Endsley (2003) calls “SA Demons”. 
Some of them, like attention and working memory, will be discussed within the context of experience. Others (e.g., 
workload, anxiety, fatigue, data overload, errant mental models, etc.) fall outside of the scope of this study. Out of a plethora 
of factors affecting SA, we focus on the effects of interface design and information processing mechanisms in individuals. 
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• User participation 
  
Table 1. Summary of current research on information security awareness. 
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INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Whereas SA may be applied to numerous security tasks, in this study we limit ourselves to IDS administration because it is 
very representative of an environment in which SA is particularly critical. Moreover, among different types of IDSs, 
anomaly-based IDSs are our primary focus because they are highly dynamic.  
The initial research on IDSs dates back to 1980s with Denning (1987) being one of the most widely cited, where she 
proposed a model of a real-time intrusion detection expert system. Her model assumes that criminal intrusions can be 
detected and monitored by the system using the library of patterns of unacceptable behaviors. Such model is composed of six 
components: subjects, objects, audit records, profiles, anomaly records, and activity rules. In essence, Denning’s IDS model 
describes a rule-based IDS, which monitors standard operations of a system, and report activities that violate predetermined 
rules. However, it does not include any additional features for dealing suspicious behaviors – the final decision regarding 
resolving potential intrusions is left to system administrator, thus making human the nexus of an effective security 
mechanism. For this very reason, SA is particularly relevant because it examines human information processing mechanisms 
when interacting with IDSs, and the resulting decision quality and defense outcome. 
A common taxonomy of IDSs is made between network-based and host-based IDSs. Network-based IDSs (NIDSs) are 
independent systems used to protect networking infrastructure and most often can be found at ingress/egress points (Trost, 
2010). Host-based IDSs (HIDSs) are designed to protect individual computers and their coverage does not extend outside the 
boundaries of hosts they are running on (Harris, 2008).  
The classification that is more relevant to our study distinguishes between three types: signature-based, rule-based, and 
anomaly-based. Signature-based IDSs are designed to scan packets, searching for predefined characteristics that could 
indicate potential security breach. Rule-based IDSs are usually associated with expert systems, consisting of knowledge base, 
inference engine, and rule-based programming. Anomaly-based IDSs is based on a predefined baseline of network traffic and 
monitors the network, seeking for deviations from the baseline. A baseline is established by learning normal operations of a 
system (Whitman & Mattord, 2008). Generally, the more time an IDS spends on learning the normal behavior of a system, 
the more accurate the baseline will represent the normal status of the network. The main benefit of anomaly-based IDS is that 
it does not rely on static signatures, which makes it particularly promising in detecting malicious patterns that have not been 
reported, including zero-day attacks. However, this promise does not automatically translate into successful detection of 
criminal intrusions. Network traffic pattern can move away from baseline simply due to legitimate business needs. 
Furthermore, anomaly-based IDSs provide administrators with rather generic alerts, thus leaving more detailed investigation 
of incidents to human operators. This is where SA becomes a critical factor. With the increasing number and sophistication of 
attacks carried out by cyber criminals, security professionals need to be able to identify such attacks on regular basis. Modern 
cyber criminals may hide their actions by deleting intrusion logs, altering time stamps, and circumventing target systems 
(Casey, 2006). High SA is significant for conducting digital investigations and preserving evidence.   
RESEARCH MODEL 
Figure 1 shows our research model. It depicts our propositions about the relationships between SA and its direct and indirect 
effects on decision quality and performance. It also illustrates how SA is determined by two of its key antecedents – 
experience and interface design. 
According to SA model (Endsley, 1995), an individual’s perception of the environment is determined by systems outputs and 
directly by her senses. Such perceptions are affected by numerous internal factors which include an individual’s cognitive 
characteristics, experience and training; as well as external factors, including characteristics of system design. SA refers to 
the state of knowledge and to the means used to acquire knowledge. It is a different construct from decision making. Having 
experience in a given domain does not necessarily imply making correct decision, due to inaccurate SA caused by “noise”. 
While IT provides users with access to large volumes of information (e.g., logs and alerts from IDSs), individuals still are 
required to be able to capture the right information and make right inferences from such data. The area of intrusion detection 
is a complex system. At the same time, depending on the severity of an alert, what IDSs do is to either alert security 
administrator about an attack or write information in logs for low-level alerts. Therefore, the administrator’s information 
processing capability becomes a critical factor and this capability has been studied from the perspective of short- versus long-
term memory. 
Hanus et al.  Situation Awareness in Detecting Criminal Intrusions 















Figure 1. Research Model. 
 
The key factors affecting how people process information involve attention and working memory as critical artifacts limiting 
acquisition and interpretation of information. Miller (1956) set the foundation for human information processing by defining 
information chunking. Seven (plus/minus two) is the “magical” number of information chunks that individuals can absorb in 
their short-term memory. 
Information processing theories assume that human memory consists of three registers: sensory memory short-term memory 
(STM), and long-term memory (LTM) (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), as illustrated in Figure 2. Sensory memory is the door 
through which information enters the processing system. Perceptions are created while the information resides in the sensory 
memory. Attention is the critical factor for the information to be passed from sensory memory to STM. If individuals come 
across a recognizable pattern in perception, they are more likely to devote attention to that observation, by already having a 
reference point towards such situation. From the criminal intrusion perspective, the presence of such patterns is critical for 
intrusion prevention, promoting faster reactions and allowing for avoidance or mitigation of potential damage. 
 
Figure 2. Memory Model. 
 
The most important characteristics of STM include very short access times and very small capacity. In contrast, LTM has 
much slower access times, but theoretically unlimited capacity. The concept of information chunk is applicable to both STM 
and LTM (Simon, 1979) and is defined as a familiar unit of experience that has been stored and indexed in memory. It could 
refer to words, letters, images, etc., depending on the level of abstraction. Thus, the chunk of information in STM can be 
thought of as an individual’s internal representation of a stimulus received from sensory memory. 
LTM can be approached from two perspectives – retrieving existing or storing new information. Storing new information to 
memory can be a sophisticated process. Not only does it involve storing new information in semantic memory, but also 
processing of the recognition memory so that new chunks can be recognized and accessed. It takes between five and ten 
seconds for an individual to transfer a new chunk of information from STM to LTM, with the exception of subject matter 
experts, for whom it takes one or two seconds. In contrast, it takes considerably less time to retrieve information already 
stored in memory – a magnitude of a few hundred milliseconds to few seconds (Simon, 1996). Again, such factor is critical 
from the intrusion detection perspective, allowing for timely responses to threats. 
The concept of STM has evolved into working memory, defined as a brain system that provides temporary storage and 
manipulation of information required for sophisticated tasks (Baddeley, 1992). Working memory is susceptible to rapid 
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decay, unless continuously practiced and repeated (Boduroglu, Minear, & Shah, 2008). Similar to Simon (1979, 1996), 
Cowan (2001) argues that the actual capacity of working memory is limited to four chunks of information. When comparing 
subject matter experts with less experienced individuals, the actual number of chunks stays constant – it is the size of a chunk 
that varies (Gobet & Simon, 1996). Scott (2007) reports that the number of chunks in working memory is constant, however, 
the size of these chunks for experts is larger than for novices. Such superior working memory capacity is present at a domain-
specific memory skills acquired to meet specific demands on working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), which is a highly 
desired trait for security professionals. 
IDS administrators include novices and experts. The former include individuals who possess theoretical background in 
intrusion detection, but lack professional experience. The latter are people with significant experience in this area. The clear 
distinction between these two groups could be attributed to presence or absence of certain knowledge patterns in each 
individual’s LTM. Such patterns have been observed in novice and expert chess players, proving to significantly affect the 
level of their game. It should be emphasized that at professional level, reaction time is an important factor, which allows us to 
extrapolate such observation towards the area of criminal intrusion detection. Given STM limitations, the challenge is to 
retrieve significant parts from all the “noise” delivered by IDSs. It is when experience becomes significant. Furthermore, 
experienced individuals should be able to handle two or more simultaneous tasks (divided attention) more effectively. Novice 
performance relies on controlled attentional processing, which is relatively slow and effortful. In contrast, experts’ 
performance is characterized by automatic processing routines that are fast and efficient, and is not limited by attention 
capacity. Ericsson & Kintsch (1995) report that if structures stored in STM resemble the ones stored in LTM, then 
experienced individuals should be able to access such information in LTM with speed and reliability comparable to speed of 
reading from STM. Thus, more experienced IDS administrators are able to retrieve information more accurately from logs 
and to make fast connection to their knowledge stored in LTM. Consequently, they have higher levels of situation awareness 
than inexperienced administrators. Therefore: 
P1: Experience positively affects situation awareness with regards to security administrators using intrusion detection 
systems. 
Security professionals interact with system’s interfaces on a daily basis, often making critical decisions based on the 
information provided by system’s interface. The role of an interface is minimizing the cognitive load required to absorb 
information and make it easier to be mentally transformed for comprehension (Boduroglu, et al., 2008). Larkin & Simon 
(1987) report several advantages of visual representation of information over textual on the example of diagrams: (1) visual 
representation can aggregate information together, reducing the amount of time required to find relevant cues in data; (2) they 
already include the location of cues, whereas in textual information linear search needs to be applied in order to find what one 
is seeking; (3) the means of representation – explicit and implicit – are strongly correlated with the ease of recognition; (4) 
visual representations are believed to increase the number of perceptual inferences that are easy for human beings. 
IDS user interfaces come in two flavors: command-line or GUI. Within the SA context, we argue that inexperienced security 
administrators will be more proficient when using GUIs. Novices may not have relevant LTM structures, which would make 
it harder for them to comprehend console-based information provided by IDSs. In contrast, experts already have existing 
representations if information delivered by the system’s interface in their LTM. Historically, console-based IDSs were 
introduced before GUI add-ons. Therefore, the experts’ LTM patterns will be based on text-based interfaces. As mentioned, it 
is difficult to recognize information from a situation if such situation is not presented in a form that matches existing 
productions. While possible to fix with proper training, such delay is undesirable, since it limits the immediate substitutability 
of one representation for another (Larkin & Simon, 1987). Although experienced professionals are able to recognize 
important information from GUIs, they may work more effectively with console-based interfaces, due to their past 
experiences. It has been observed that experienced administrators prefer using console-based interfaces, even though they are 
often presented with a GUI alternative. Studies show that, outstanding memory skills are almost always restricted to one type 
of material (e.g., Ericsson & Charness, 1994). Applied to the IDSs context, novices are more likely to rely on GUI-based 
interfaces than command-line because of their limited memory capacity. In contrast, experienced professionals are more 
inclined to using text-based IDSs thanks to better information processing capabilities. Using an interface that is a misfit for 
the administrator’s experience level can hamper her ability to understand the situation. In other words, interface has a bearing 
on the level of SA that an administrator is able to achieve, given her experience level. Therefore, we posit: 
P2: Intrusion detection system interface design moderates the relationship between experience and situation awareness. 
SA is a highly dynamic process, which implies that SA is built over time. Although Endsley (1995) refers to SA as an 
individual’s knowledge of the environment at a given point in time, such knowledge should not be perceived as dichotomous 
(existent or not). The process of acquiring knowledge is gradual, and at specific moment of time it contains references to both 
past experiences and inferences about the future. Therefore, it is critical to know the amount of time that will pass before 
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some event occurs. In case of IDSs, it is the elapsed time between the moment when a system alerts the administrator and the 
moment when a corrective action is undertaken. It has been shown that an individual’s perception of a situation (i.e., situation 
specifics) determines the decision process selected to solve a problem. In the absence of certain mental models represented in 
SA, individuals are likely to fail to solve an issue (Endsley, 1995). Therefore, SA and decision making are two separate 
constructs. However, high levels of SA increase the probability of exercising recommended behaviors, especially if some 
actions are executed in an automatic manner, subconsciously omitting the evaluation of options required for decision making 
process. Thus, we expect well-informed decisions based on high levels of SA to be positively correlated with performance of 
recommended actions, but in some cases such actions could be executed in an automated manner. Thus performance can be 
predicted as a combination of SA and decision making (Endsley, 1995). As a result, more experienced security administrators 
will arrive at more accurate decisions and will be able to transform these decisions into recommended actions. We also 
expect that individuals demonstrating high levels of SA will be more likely to perform certain actions in an automatic 
manner, per our discussion on information processing. Therefore, we propose: 
P3: Higher levels of SA are correlated with more accurate decisions. 
P4: More accurate decisions are correlated with the performance of recommended actions. 
P5: High levels of SA are correlated with better performance of recommended actions.  
CONCLUSION 
Detection of criminal intrusions is, to a large extent, about analyzing the threats and the security administrator’s with 
interactions with information generated by IDSs. We have framed the discussion over our research question in the specific 
domain of intrusion detection systems. We have shown that current studies on the topic do not approach cybercrime and 
awareness from the SA perspective, which we have applied in this paper. The main reasoning behind such an approach was 
to emphasize the importance of the dynamics involved with information security. The situation with regards to IDSs can 
change in a rampant manner. Therefore, it is important that the users are prepared to react properly in a timely manner. Also, 
we emphasized the importance of two antecedents of SA – experience (viewed from information processing perspective) and 
interface design. Moreover, due to multiple combinations of these two factors, there may not be one perfect solution that 
would suit all users’ needs. Even within a narrow discipline (i.e., intrusion detection) there may be different designs required 
in order to fit heterogeneous group of professionals. Therefore, system designers should consider taking user-centered design 
approach and thus carefully evaluate characteristics (i.e., information processing patterns based on previous experience, 
training, and education) of the individuals who would be using the system in critical role of criminal intrusion detection.  
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